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THE RELEVANCE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
TO GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION
Donald W. Dowd*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many years ago, then Senator Hugh Scott wrote me a sur-
prising letter assuring me that by killing some long forgotten
gun control bill he had protected my interest as a hunter. I wrote
back indicating that in Philadelphia I felt more like the hunted
than a hunter. Pennsylvania is a big state, and there is a big
difference between the way guns are viewed in Philadelphia and
Elk County.1 Certainly some Philadelphians are fond of guns,
but enthusiasts often include drug dealers, muggers, and kids in
street gangs. Many other Philadelphians have their sleep shat-
tered by gun shots, and others live in fear of armed robbery,
drive-by shootings, gang warfare and random fire. These Phila-
delphians view the gun as an enemy, and they have little feeling
of how-to the residents of Elk County-the gun may seem a
friend, fun to shoot, necessary for hunting and occasionally use-
ful to scare off a trespasser. These different perceptions have
clashed in both state and national legislatures during numerous
battles about laws that would impose gun controls.
A rallying cry of those who oppose gun controls is that such
legislation would fly in the face of the Second Amendment, which
endows all Americans with the right to keep arms. Many gun
control opponents believe that we started our nation as a free
people who could be trusted with firearms, and we should not
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. A.B., 1951, J.D.,
1954, Harvard University. Research assistance provided by Daniel Layden, J.D., 1997,
Villanova University School of Law.
1. Reflecting these concerns, Philadelphia enacted municipal ordinances in an
attempt to curb the trend of urban violence. However, the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court ruled that the city was prohibited from passing such ordinances by
state legislation. See Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 655 A.2d 194 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995)
(dismissing a petition by representatives of Philadelphia challenging the constitution-
ality of state gun control legislation). In Ortiz, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania upheld amendments to Pennsylvania's Uniform Firearms Act, 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 6101-6124 (West 1983 & Supp. 1996), which prohibited municipalities
from enacting local gun control ordinances. See Ortiz, 655 A.2d at 195-96. Represen-
tatives of Philadelphia and various interest groups, including the Philadelphia Anti-
Drug/Anti-Violence Network, the Consumer Education and Protective Association, the
Fathers Day Rally Committee and the National Congress of Puerto Rican Rights,
challenged the constitutionality of the statute that preempted a city ordinance pro-
hibiting a variety of assault weapons. See id. at 195. The court held that
Philadelphia's unique gun control concerns were insufficient to usurp the
Commonwealth's overriding power to legislate. See id. at 197-98.
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surrender our birthright out of fear. This appeal has strong emo-
tional, political, and historical pull. Although the Second Amend-
ment looms large in the rhetoric of gun control opponents, and
appeals to it may have helped defeat gun control bills, it has had
little real effect as a constitutional limit. In fact, the United
States Supreme Court has never invalidated legislation under
this Amendment and has only considered Second Amendment
claims in three cases. In United States v. Cruikshank, the Court
held that the Second Amendment created no right to keep or
bear arms.' In Presser v. Illinois,4 it held that the Second
Amendment was not applicable to state legislation,5 and in Unit-
2. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
3. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553. In Cruikshank, the Supreme Court re-
versed the criminal convictions of several Ku Klux Klan members obtained under the
Enforcement Act of 1870. See id. at 544-48, 559. The defendants were convicted of
depriving African-American citizens of the rights and privileges secured to them un-
der the Constitution and laws of the United States. See id. at 544-48. Among the
rights deemed violated was the right to bear arms. See id. at 545. Chief Justice
Waite, speaking for the Court, noted that the right to bear arms "is not a right
granted by the Constitution" and is not "in any manner dependent upon that instru-
ment for its existence." Id. at 553. The Chief Justice further stated that "[t]he Sec-
ond Amendment declares that [the right to bear arms] shall not be infringed; but
this . . . means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one
of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the nation-
al government . . . ." Id.
Cruikshank is generally cited for the proposition that the Second Amendment
does not apply against the states. See id. at 553. However, this rule stands only as
part of a larger decision which held that the Fourteenth Amendment generally, and
the Enforcement Act of 1870 specifically, did not create new rights, but rather only
protected those rights existing prior to the Constitution's adoption. See id. at 554-55.
4. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
5. See Presser, 116 U.S. at 264-65. The defendant in Presser was convicted of
violating an Illinois statute prohibiting armed public association, drilling, or parading
by citizens not part of the state militia. See id. at 253-54. In upholding the convic-
tion, the Court rejected Presser's appeal that the statute conflicted with the military
powers granted to the federal government under the Constitution and Second Amend-
ment. See id. at 264-65. The Court stated in its holding that the Second Amendment
"is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National Government,
[but] . . . not upon that of the States." Id. at 265.
While Presser exposes the inefficacy of the Second Amendment as a viable
restriction on states, Presser is a good example of the possible effectiveness of alter-
native challenges to gun control legislation rather than traditional Second Amend-
ment challenges. Regulation of self-styled "militia groups," or their military parades
or gatherings could be challenged under the First Amendment as violative of the
rights of free association and symbolic speech. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (holding a Texas statute which criminalized public flag burning was violative
of First Amendment free speech protection); National Socialist Party v. Village of
Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (ordering a stay of injunction which prohibited military
type parade by the National Socialist Party). Further, a recent lower court case has
indicated that the sale of guns under some circumstances might be protected as
.commercial speech." See Nordyke v. County of Santa Clara, 933 F. Supp. 903 (N.D.
2
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ed States v. Miller,6 it held that the Second Amendment was not
applicable to the keeping of arms unless the arms had "some
reasonable relation to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia."7
As a longtime observer of the Supreme Court and its consti-
tutional decision-making, I am well aware that constitutional
rights never thought of before may suddenly emerge' and rights
considered dead may come to life.9 Although long ignored, the
Second Amendment has recently been the subject of lively and
provocative commentary; some scholars argue for a very narrow
reading of this Amendment, ° and books argue for a very broad
Cal. 1996) (holding a lease provision banning gun sales at county fairgrounds is an
unconstitutional violation of First Amendment commercial speech rights).
6. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
7. Id. at 178. The defendants in Miller were indicted for possessing sawed-off
shotguns in violation of the National Firearms Act of 1934. See id. at 174-75. The
Western District Court for Arkansas quashed the indictments, holding the Firearms
Act unconstitutional on Second Amendment grounds. See id. at 177. The Supreme
Court, in a brief opinion reversing the district court and remanding for trial, held
that the Second Amendment protects only those weapons related to militia activity.
See id. at 178. The Court stated:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
"shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this
time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guaran-
tees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly, it is not
within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military
equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
Id. (citation omitted).
8. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (examining the fundamental due
process privacy right to abortion secured under the Fourteenth Amendment);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the first major modern-era case using
a substantive due process approach to fundamental rights).
9. See e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (invalidating a fed-
eral statute for the first time in sixty years on grounds that Congress exceeded its
constitutional powers under the Commerce Clause).
10. See Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365 (1993);
Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On
Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661 (1989);
Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the
Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the
Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary Theory of the Second Amendment,
62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 649-50 & n.35 (1995); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan,
The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia
Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989); Peter Buck Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The
Second Amendment: A Second Look, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 46 (1966-67); Dennis
Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 107 (1991);
Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False Consciousness and Dereliction of
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 67-68 (1995); John Levin, The Right to
Bear Arms: The Development of the American Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 148
(1971); Ralph J. Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional
3
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reading." In this paper I would like to speculate on how some
of these arguments would likely fare in the Supreme Court today
and discuss whether the Second Amendment could become a
meaningful legal weapon in the war over gun controls. In Part
II, I consider the proffered interpretations of the Second Amend-
ment as follows: (1) the state militia theory argues that the Sec-
History, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 53 (1966); Robert E. Shalhope & Lawrence Delbert
Cress, The Second Amendment and the Right to Bear Arms: An Exchange, 71 J. AM.
HIST. 587 (1984); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An His-
torical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1975); David
C. Williams, Civil Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991).
11. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS:
THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991); Donald L. Beschle, Reconsid-
ering the Second Amendment: Constitutional Protection for a Right of Security, 9
HAMIiNE L. REV. 69 (1986); Sayoko Blodgett-Ford, The Changing Meaning of the
Right to Bear Arms, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 101 (1995); Michelle Capezza, Com-
ment, Controlling Guns: A Call for Consistency in Judicial Review of Challenges to
Gun Control Legislation, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1467 (1995); Robert J. Cottrol &
Raymond T. Diamond, 'Never Intended to be Applied to the White Population:" Fire-
arms Regulation and Racial Disparity-The Redeemed South's Legacy to a National
Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995) [hereinafter Racial Disparity];
Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Arnericanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991) [hereinafter Afro-Americanist];
Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke from the Right to Bear Arms and the Second
Amendment, 29 AKRON L. REV. 57 (1995); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does
the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65 (1983);
William Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal History,
136 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1992); Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty-A Look at the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 63 (1982); Stephen P. Halbrook,
What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to "Bear Arms", 49
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (Winter 1986) [hereinafter Linguistic Analysis]; David
T. Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward a Jurisprudence of the Second
Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 559 (1986) [hereinafter Armed Citizens];
David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights,
4 J.L. & POL. 1, 45-49 (1987) [hereinafter Historiography]; Don B. Kates, Jr., Gun
Control: Separating Reality from Symbolism, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 353 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Gun Control]; Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning
of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983) [hereinafter Original Mean-
ing]; David B. Kopel, Rational Basis Analysis of "Assault Weapon" Prohibition, 20 J.
CONTEMP. L. 381 (1994); David B. Kopel et al., A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to
Bear Arms In State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1177 (1995); Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); Joyce Lee
Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law Tra-
dition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983); Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., The Second
Amendment Ain't About Hunting, 34 How. L.J. 589 (1991); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A
Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); Robert E.
Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM. HIST. 599
(1982); William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to
Arms, 43 Duke L.J. 1236 (1994).
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ond Amendment is only concerned with the keeping of arms to
protect state militias from federal destruction; (2) the republican
militia theory argues that the keeping of arms by the members
of a universal republican militia in order to preserve the right to
resist tyranny is protected by the Second Amendment; and (3)
the individual rights theory argues that the Second Amendment
protects the individual right to keep arms for self-defense, hunt-
ing, or any other legitimate purpose.
In Part III, I consider whether the Second Amendment is
applicable to state legislation and whether the Second Amend-
ment could be a source of federal power as well as a limit on it.
In Part IV, I consider standards of review that could be applied
to Second Amendment limits on gun control legislation. Finally,
in Part V, I conclude by considering how relevant the Second
Amendment will prove to the Supreme Court's consideration of
gun control legislation.
II. SECOND AMENDMENT INTERPRETATIONS
A. The Right to Keep Arms Under the State Militia Theory
1. Textual Arguments
The Second Amendment states that "[a] well regulated Mili-
tia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 2
This provision, like many other parts of the Constitution, is not
remarkably clear. The initial issue in considering this text is
whether the first clause (the "militia clause") explains and im-
plicitly limits the second clause. In United States v. Miller, the
Supreme Court held that the militia clause was a limit on the
right to keep and bear arms and that arms not suitable for mili-
tia use were not covered by the Second Amendment because they
were not reasonably related to a well-regulated militia. 3 In
Miller, the Court did not consider whether the keeping of arms
suitable for militia service, but not specifically held for that pur-
pose, was covered by the Second Amendment.
Today, the Supreme Court would probably follow a consis-
tent line of Circuit Court cases14 and go beyond Miller to hold
12. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
13. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. For a discussion of Miller, see supra note 7.
14. For a survey of the positions taken by the federal circuit courts concerning
the prohibitive scope of the Second Amendment, see generally United States v. Hale,
978 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the Second Amendment only protects
1997]
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that the Second Amendment prohibits infringement of the right
to keep and bear arms only when the arms are kept to perform
militia obligations.15 The Supreme Court could reason that the
possession of those weapons with a reasonable relation to a well regulated militia),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1614 (1993); Fresno Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van De
Kamp, 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the Second Amendment limits only
federal power, not the states'); Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990)
(dismissing the argument that the Second Amendment allows for private possession
of machine guns); United States v. Nelsen, 859 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding
that prohibition of switchblade knives did not impair the state militia and therefore
did not violate the Second Amendment); United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir. 1984) (holding that the right to possess a gun is not a fundamental right);
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that hand-
gun possession is not guaranteed by the Second Amendment); United States v. Rose,
695 F.2d 1356 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that a prosecution for possession of unregis-
tered Uzi semi-automatic weapons did not violate the right to bear arms); United
States v. Houston, 547 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d
384 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that the Second Amendment does not protect the right
to possess weapons unrelated to militia, even though the defendant was technically a
member of the state militia); United States v. King, 532 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that the possession of
a weapon must bear a reasonable relation to a well-regulated militia for Second
Amendment protection); United States v. Birmley, 529 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976); Unit-
ed States v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that there was no
absolute constitutional right for individual possession of firearms); United States v.
Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Three Winchester 30-30
Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that the stat-
ute prohibiting possession of firearms by a convicted felon does not infringe on Sec-
ond Amendment right to bear arms); Eckert v. City of Philadelphia, 477 F.2d 610
(3d Cir. 1973) (finding right to bear arms must be reasonably related to the preser-
vation or efficiency of well regulated militia); United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562
(6th Cir. 1973) (stating that no right to individual possession of arms is granted by
the Constitution and Congress has the power to regulate weaponry under the Com-
merce Clause); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding that the
Second Amendment is not an absolute bar to congressional regulation); United States
v. Tomlin, 454 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding that statutes requiring registration
of firearms are not an unconstitutional infringement on Second Amendment rights);
United States v. Johnson, 441 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1971) (requiring a showing that a
federally-regulated weapon is related to the efficiency of a state militia for Second
Amendment protection to apply); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.
1971) (noting that the constitutional right to keep arms applies only to the right of
the state to maintain a militia and not to the individual right of gun possession);
United States v. McCutcheon, 446 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Lauchli,
444 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1971)
(holding that then record keeping requirements of the Gun Control Act of 1968 do
not infringe on the right to bear arms); United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (8th
Cir. 1971); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942) (finding that the
Second Amendment does not act as an absolute bar against federal regulation of
weapon possession); United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that
the possession of a weapon must be reasonably related to the preservation of a mili-
tia for Second Amendment protection to apply), rev'd on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463
(1943).
15. See Herz, supra note 10, at 72-82 (arguing that federal jurisprudence clearly
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 58 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/5
GUN CONTROL
militia limitation on the right to keep and bear arms would be
meaningless if the keeping of arms was not related to militia
service. No other reason for keeping arms is supported by the
language of the Second Amendment, and there is no mention of
the need to keep arms for self-defense, hunting, recreation, or
any other purpose.
The term "militia" is used in various provisions of the Con-
stitution in ways that show what kind of militia was envisioned
by the Second Amendment. The reference within the Second
Amendment itself is not just to a militia, but to a "well regulated
militia."'6 In the body of the Constitution there are also several
references to the term "militia."'7 Article I gives the Congress
the "[p]ower ... [t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to exe-
cute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions... ," as well as the power to organize, arm, and
discipline a militia, but reserves to the states the right to ap-
point its officers." In Article II, the President is made the Com-
mander in Chief of "the Militia of the several states, when called
into the actual Service of the United States." ° These provisions
provide a basis for the Court to conclude that the type of service
protected by one's right to keep and bear arms is prescribed to
an organized state militia, not simply an amorphous body of men
and certainly not groups simply using the name "militia."2'
If the Supreme Court adopted this reading of the Second
Amendment, the Amendment would become irrelevant to almost
all gun control legislation. Because only regulations of weapons
kept for state militia service would be protected, the Second
Amendment would apply only to the rare case where the state
supports a narrow interpretation of the right to bear arms under the Second Amend-
ment, and consequently supports a broad range of valid governmental regulation).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
17. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 15, 16.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
19. The Constitution explicitly states:
The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be
employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States re-
spectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training
the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress . . ..
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
21. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 266 (1886). The Court in Presser con-
sidered the fact that the defendant did not belong to an organized state militia or a
United States troop to be fatal to his challenge of the Illinois statute prohibiting
public paramilitary activity. See id.
1997]
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militia required or permitted its members to keep arms for mili-
tia service and federal legislation impinged on that right. Never-
theless, current disputes over gun control legislation are con-
cerned with this kind of impingement. However, under this read-
ing, the Second Amendment would be, for all practical purposes,
truly irrelevant to gun control laws.
2. Historical Arguments
a. Standing Army Argument
To many commentators, a narrow textual reading of a right
expressly given in the Bill of Rights is a flawed approach to
constitutional interpretation.22 They insist that the true mean-
ing of the Second Amendment can only be understood by looking
to history and that such an historical analysis would show that
the Second Amendment was not meant to be limited to arms
held for state militia purposes.23 Clio, the muse of history, how-
ever, has not proven to be the most reliable, steady, or just muse
for constitutional interpretation.24 Chief Justice Marshall ig-
nored history and relied on language and logic in his decision in
Marbury v. Madison,25 while conversely, Chief Justice Taney in
the infamous Dred Scott26 case stated that he was bound by his-
tory to hold that blacks could not be considered persons or citi-
22. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 464-75. Scholars adhering to the "standard
model" of Second Amendment interpretation note that the Amendment's text and his-
torical underpinnings support an individual right to keep and bear arms. See id. at
466. These academics argue that the Framers intended the Second Amendment to
secure an individual, not collective, right to possess weapons. See id. at 466-68. See
also, MALCOLM, supra note 11, at 119; Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11, at
218-24.
23. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 464-75. See also, MALCOLM, supra note 11,
at 218-24.
24. Some commentators argue that judicial application of the original intent
doctrine in making case decisions is not only ineffective but is also often inaccurate.
See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
284-320 (1988) (analyzing the efficacy of historical analysis by judiciary); Alfred H.
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 119, 155
(Philip B. Kurland, ed., 1965) (stating that "[t]he Court, in performing its self-as-
sumed role as a constitutional historian, has been, if not a naked king, no better
than a very ragged one").
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, however, is a strict adherent to the
original intent model and espouses the strict application of constitutional text and
history in modern jurisprudence. See Christopher E. Smith, Bent on Original Intent:
Justice Thomas is Asserting a Distinct and Cohesive Vision, ABA JOURNAL, October
1996, at 48.
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
26. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
8
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zens under the Constitution since they were not so regarded at
the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.27 Even today, the
"original intent" controversy rages on.28 Historians paint and
repaint their pictures of the past so that historical views are
subject to continuing re-evaluation while lawyers and judges use
bits and pieces of historical evidence not to illuminate the past,
but to bolster an argument or prove a point about the present.
Regardless of whether it is misread or misunderstood, the histo-
ry enshrined in court decisions lives on as doctrine.
Advocates of the historical approach criticize advocates of
the textual approach for ignoring the colorful history surround-
ing the term "militia." When the Second Amendment was adopt-
ed, memories of England's glorious revolution, a century earlier,
had not faded and memories of the American Revolution were
fresh indeed. Still more vivid was the awareness of the disorder
in the decade following the American Revolution.29 An historical
interpretation would require the Court to consider not only the
words of the Second Amendment, but the concerns of the Fram-
ers that prompted the adoption of the Second Amendment. What
were the concerns?
Primarily, there was the lingering fear that a standing fed-
eral army would lord over the people of the new nation." In the
27. See id. at 404-05.
28. See LEVY, supra note 24, at 388 (arguing that judges often misuse an origi-
nal intent analysis in constitutional decision making); see also Jacobus tenBroek, Use
by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction:
The Intent Theory of Constitutional Construction, 27 CAL. L. REV. 399 (1939) (con-
cluding that intent theory inverts proper judicial process).
Historical analysis and the "original intent" theory are employed by advocates
on both sides of the Second Amendment debate as support for their respective posi-
tions. See, e.g., Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11 (applying intent theory and
historical analysis in arguing that the Second Amendment was intended to provide
an individual right to arms). But see Weatherup, supra note 10, at 1000 (stating that
the "[d]elegates to the Constitutional Convention had no intention of establishing any
personal right to keep and bear arms" and that therefore, an historical analysis of
the Second Amendment favors a collectivist interpretation).
29. See generally MERRILL JENSON, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES DURiNG THE CONFEDERATION (1962).
30. See, e.g., Weatherup, supra note 10, at 982. The potential threat of a stand-
ing army to the republic and individual liberties was a central concern of the consti-
tutional framers. For example, Samuel Adams wrote that "a standing army, however
necessary it be at sometimes, is always dangerous to the liberties of the peo-
ple . . . .Such power should be watched with a jealous eye." JENSON, supra note 29,
at 29. Likewise, James Madison entertained Adams suspicion, stating that "a stand-
ing military force, with an overgrown Executive, will not long be safe companions to
liberty. The means of defense [against] foreign danger, have always been the instru-
ments of tyranny at home." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
465 (M. Farrand, ed., 1911).
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Federalist Papers, James Madison urged the ratification of the
Constitution and addressed fears that Congressional power to
establish a federal army was potentially destructive to the
states.3 Madison explained that such fears were visionary be-
cause no federal army could impose its will on the states when
the federal army was small compared to the vast state militia.32
Madison further argued that the federal army was not like the
army of a European tyrant.33 Specifically, it could not prevail
over the American people because they elected their own govern-
ments, were permitted to have arms, and were led by officers of
the militia appointed by their local governments.' In spite of
Madison's assurances, skeptics urged that the framers include a
prohibition against standing armies in the Bill of Rights.35 How-
ever, the ban on standing armies was not incorporated. Instead,
the following compromises were preserved in the body of the
Constitution: (1) the provision that created a federal army but
required reappropriation for the army to be held every two
years;36 and (2) a provision that created a militia officered by
the states but subject to federal call-up and regulation.37 The
The Supreme Court has recognized the role that fear of a standing army had
upon the enactment of the Second Amendment. In United States v. Miller, the Court
noted:
The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in
contrast with the Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the
consent of Congress. The sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing
armies; the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws
could be secured through the militia....
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178-79 (1939).
31. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. George Mason, author of the Virginia Bill of Rights, refused to sign the
final draft of the Constitution because it failed to protect the liberty of the people
from the danger of a standing army in time of peace. See MALCOM, supra note 11, at
155. Likewise, Elbridge Gerry, a delegate of Massachusetts, objected that the Con-
stitution did not provide sufficient checks against the danger of a standing army. See
id. at 153. Even Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to James Madison, noted that the
Constitution as drafted was incomplete because it lacked a federal declaration of
rights, including protection against standing armies. See id. at 157.
During the early phases of drafting the Bill of Rights, a proposal was set
forth; this proposal included what would become the Second Amendment statement
that standing armies are "dangerous to liberty" and would be authorized in peace
time only upon a vote by two-thirds of each House of Congress. See HARDY, Histori-
ography, supra note 11, at 57 & n. 255. The proposal failed and the Second Amend-
ment eventually passed without limiting federal armed forces. See id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
37. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15, 16.
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adoption of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights could be
viewed as a partial response to the standing army concern be-
cause it affirmed the importance of the militia and assured that
its members could not be disarmed.38 This historical argument
that the Second Amendment was designed to protect state mili-
tia from federal encroachment complements the textual argu-
ment that the "militia" clause limits the "right to keep and bear
arms" clause39 and thus supports a state militia reading of the
Second Amendment.
b. The Second Amendment and the Right to Resist or Revolt
Historically, the term "militia" did not mean a state militia,
but rather a body of men that was responsible for defending its
community.' This forms the basis of the republican militia the-
ory.
The first argument supporting the republican militia theory
is that the people have the individual right to resist tyranny. In
making this argument, some commentators rely on history which
they feel proves that the Second Amendment is not only about
the relation of the state militia and the federal standing army,
but also about the essential role of the militia in resisting tyran-
38. See, e.g., Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11, at 215-17 (noting that
establishing a well-armed militia was accomplished by guaranteeing arms for individ-
ual citizens); id. at 217 n.53 (arguing that the "independence and self reliance neces-
sary to [a] citizen of [the] republic was protected by assuring each individual the
right to possess the arms necessary to defending, and securing food for himself and
his family"); Shalhope, supra note 11, at 604-12 (stating that the Framers "firmly be-
lieved that the character and spirit of the republic rested on the freeman's possession
of arms as well as his ability to defend himself and his society"). But see Dunlap,
supra note 10, at 649-50 & n.35 (recognizing but dismissing the argument that the
Second Amendment protects arms for hunting and self protection).
Pennsylvania delegates, during the Constitution's ratification period, published
a series of proposals for a federal bill of rights that explicitly noted the individual
nature of the right to bear arms. Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11, at 222.
The Pennsylvania proposal stated:
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves
and their own State or the United States, or for the Purpose of killing
game; and no law shall be passed for disarming any of them unless for
crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals ....
2 BILL SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 665 (1971).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. II.
40. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 179. The Court stated in Miller that "[t]he significa-
tion attributed to the term Militia appears from the debates in the Convention, the
history and the legislation of Colonies and States, and the writings of approved com-
mentators. These show plainly enough that the Militia comprised all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense." Id.
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ny.41 In his provocative article, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment, Professor Levinson criticizes the interpretation that
the Second Amendment was only meant to protect state militia
from federal attempts to disarm its members.42 He states that
this interpretation is historically and philosophically inaccurate
because it does not take into account the republican ideas of the
Anti-Federalists, who were the moving forces in securing the
adoption of the Bill of Rights.43 These republican ideas included
the idea of a universal militia of all able-bodied male citizens
armed so they might be able to resist an oppressive government.
Professor Levinson argues that the Second Amendment was
adopted to secure this right and thus the Second Amendment
protects the right of all able-bodied men to keep arms in readi-
ness for a call to defend the state or to resist a tyrannical
state." Professor Levinson concludes that this protection means
41. See generally Levinson, supra note 11.
42. See id. at 645-52.
43. See id. See generally Reynolds, supra note 11; Van Alstyne, supra note 11;
Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11; Hardy, Historiography, supra note 11;
Shalhope, supra note 10.
44. See Levinson, supra note 11, at 651-52; see also Williams, supra note 10, at
559-60 (analyzing the Levinson article and recognizing the collective right of a uni-
versal militia to keep arms under the Second Amendment); see also Dunlap, supra
note 10, at 653-56 (discussing the historical right to revolution attributed to the
Second Amendment under republicanism); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES § 1890
(1833) (recognizing that the Second Amendment and an armed citizenry are realistic
means of resisting tyranny).
The fear of a standing army and a tyrannical federal government lies at the
center of the Second Amendment. See Weatherup, supra note 10, at 982. Patrick
Henry equated the potential tyranny of Congress with that of the English crown and
suggested that force might be necessary to preserve the future liberty of the states.
See Letter from T. Jefferson to Wm. Smith, in THOMAS JEFFERSON WRITINGS 911 (M.
Peterson ed. 1984). Therefore, some scholars argue that the founders sought to pro-
tect the right to arms for all "able bodied men" to assure that the people remained
"dangerous to tyranny" and prepared to revolt if necessary. See Moncure, supra note
11, at 596. In fact, the right of the people to overthrow an oppressive government
was often viewed both as a right and an affinmative duty. The Declaration of Inde-
pendence provides that:
[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive to these ends, it
is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Gov-
ernment . . . .Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long estab-
lished should not be changed for light or transient causes .... But when
a long a train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same
Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their
right, it is their duty, to throw of such Government and to provide new
Guards for their future security.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added); see also
Moncure, supra note 11, at 596 (examining Virginia's Declaration of Rights, which
imposes a civic duty to overturn despotic government).
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that most men, as part of the universal militia, would have the
right to keep arms.45
The picture of brave, patriotic farmers armed with their own
muskets and minutemen, acting not as a part of the British-
controlled militia, but at the call of their neighbors and friends
to resist tyranny, supports a reading of the Second Amendment
sustaining the right to keep and bear arms to resist an oppres-
sive government. Based on this picture of revolutionary history,
it may be reasonable to interpret the Second Amendment as
ensuring the right to resist the tyranny of Washington D.C. or
Boston, as well as London, by preserving an armed citizenry.
However, a look at post-Revolution history may well lead to
another conclusion.
The history of the United States, between the enactment of
the Articles of Confederation and the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, does not support the right to resist or revolt. When Captain
Daniel Shays led his poor western Massachusetts farmers
against the tyranny of Boston in 1787, he may have thought of
himself as a minuteman. However, he soon found out that he
was considered an insurrectionist-if not a traitor-by Samuel
Adams, who, as a leader of the American Whigs, was one of the
fathers of the American Revolution. Samuel Adams was also
among the most radical extollers of the right to resist both the
British taxes, which were imposed without representation, and
the standing army of England, whose job was to enforce the
imposition of those taxes.4' To Samuel Adams, the difference
between his revolt against London and Shays' revolt against Bos-
ton was clear.47 England was a distant power that imposed its
45. Levinson does not comment on old and infirm men and all women, but I
suppose "militiaman" would today be transmuted into "person."
46. Samuel Adams' status as a radical leader of the revolutionary movement is
well documented. See generally RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, SAMUEL ADAMS: PROMOTER
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1975); JOHN C. MILLER, SAM ADAMS: PIONEER IN
PROPAGANDA (1936). His passionate propaganda served as a major impetus in stirring
the colonies toward revolt. See HARLOW, supra, at 190 (noting that Adams' actions
and commentaries were aimed at stirring up the revolutionary emotions of the peo-
ple).
However, once the Revolution ended and America secured its independence,
Adams' character seems to have shifted from revolutionary inciter to governmental
preserver. As early as 1784, Adams showed contempt for community grievances con-
cerning the new federal government. See id. at 315. When Shays' Rebellion occurred
in 1787, Adams was as relentless in his demands for the drastic punishment of the
insurgents as he was in demanding English blood a decade earlier. See id. at 316.
See MARION L. STARKEY, A LIrLE REBELLION 198 (1955) (noting Adams' inflexibility
concerning the arrest and punishment of Shays' rebels).
47. See HARLOW, supra note 46, at 315-16.
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will on an unrepresented people, and therefore, the people had a
right to revolt.' But Massachusetts was the people's state
where citizens could vote and petition.49 The right to take arms
against a tyranny is not the right to take arms against a democ-
racy.5 ° In any event, Shays lost; but Massachusetts and the rest
of the nation were given a fright and made aware of the weak-
ness of dealing with such problems under the Articles of Confed-
eration. Furthermore, Shays' Rebellion prompted the adoption of
the Constitution.5 In the early years of the republic, the federal
48. See id. at 316.
49. See id. at 315-16.
50. See STARKEY, supra note 46, at 198. Adams justified his stern position by
distinguishing the American Revolution from rebellions against the Union. He stated
that '[i]n monarchy the crime of treason may admit of being pardoned or lightly
punished . . .but the man who dares rebel against the laws of a republic ought to
suffer death." Id.
Thomas Jefferson took a different view. John Morse, a Nineteenth century
biographer, wrote:
To the gaze of such a patriot everything which took place in his own coun-
try seemed admirable. Even Shay's insurrection in Massachusetts, which, by
the alarm that it spread among all thinking men, contributed largely to the
adoption of the new Constitution, seemed to Jefferson a commendable occur-
rence. Undeniably he talked some very bad nonsense about it.
The commotions offer nothing threatening; they are a proof
that the people have liberty enough, and I could not wish them
less than they have. If the happiness of the mass of the people
can be secured at the expense of a little .. . blood, it will be a
precious purchase. To punish these errors too severely would be to
suppress the only safeguard of the public liberty. A little rebellion
now and then is a good thing, . . . an observation of this truth
should render honest republican governors so mild in their punish-
ment of rebellions as not to discourage them too much. It is a
medicine necessary for the sound health of government. Thus I
calculate,-an insurrection in one of thirteen States in the course
of eleven years that they have subsisted, amounts to one in any
particular State in one hundred and forty-three years, say a centu-
ry and a half. This would not be near as many as have happened
in every other government that has ever existed. So that we shall
have the difference between a light and a heavy government as
clear gain. Can history produce an instance of rebellion .... What
signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty
must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots
and tyrants. It is its natural manure.
It shakes one's faith in mankind to find a really great statesman
uttering such folly!
JOHN MORSE, THOMAS JEFFERSON 90-91 (Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1883).
The Supreme Court has expressly rejected the right to rebellion. Denis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) ("Whatever theoretical merit there may be to
the argument that there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governments it is
without force where the existing structure of the government provides for peaceful
and orderly change.").
51. See Weatherup, supra note 11, at 981. James Madison wrote in his intro-
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government repeatedly put down revolts and insurgencies.52 In
light of this history, it is not likely that the Second Amendment
was meant to give constitutional protection to the likes of Daniel
Shays to keep arms for insurrection. Militias were intended to
suppress insurrections and not to further them.
Two other arguments have been advanced against finding
support in the Second Amendment for protection of the right to
resist or revolt. First, even if the Second Amendment embodied
some republican right of resistance or revolt which required the
keeping of arms, that right could not be exercised today because
it would be based on the presumption that those who had the
right to be armed and resist were those who had been schooled
together in republican virtue as part of a meaningful universal
militia. Some argue the republican militia theory is anachronis-
tic because today there is no universal militia and no schooling
in common virtue.53 Second, the right to resist or revolt has no
meaningful significance today because resistance against a mod-
ern state with privately held arms is fanciful.5' In essence, it
may be debatable whether or not Americans today lack the re-
publican virtues of their eighteenth century ancestors, but it
cannot be doubted that the balance of firepower has shifted over-
whelmingly from the people to the state.5" Perhaps this does not
ductory notes on the Federal Convention of 1776 that Shays' Rebellion was one of
the "ripening incidents" that led to the Convention. See id. See also HARLOW, supra
note 46, at 304-27.
52. See generally ORVILLE J. VICTOR, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONSPIRACIES
(1973). The nation's first several decades saw some notable insurrections and conspir-
acies against the Union, including the "State of Frankland" Insurrection, Shays' Re-
bellion, the Whiskey Insurrection, Wilkinson's Western Conspiracy, Denmark Vesey's
Slave Insurrection, Nat Turner's Slave Insurrection, the South Carolina Nullification
Insurrection, the "Patriot" War, Dorr's Rebellion, and John Brown's Conspiracy. See
id.
The state militias were also used to quash race and labor riots, which struck
American cities in the nineteenth century, including the New York riot of 1834, the
Providence Snowtown riot of 1831, the Cincinnati riots of 1841, and the Philadelphia
race riot of 1849. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Afro-Americanist,
supra note 11, at 340-42.
53. See Brown, supra note 10. Brown argues that the republican right of revo-
lution presupposes a virtuous citizenry, which does not exist in modern America. See
id. at 663-65. Therefore, the right to armed revolt no longer exists under Second
Amendment republican theory. See id; see also Williams, supra note 10, at 561 (stat-
ing that "[i]f the citizenry is not virtuous, we have no assurance that it will use its
arms in virtuous ways").
54. See Dunlap, supra note 10, at 660-67. Colonel Dunlap, a Staff Judge Advo-
cate in the United States Air Force, maintains that the sophistication of modern
armies and weaponry renders moot the question of rightful insurrection by the popu-
lace. See id. at 666-67.
55. See id. at 660-67.
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make the idea of citizen armed resistance anachronistic, and the
Second Amendment moot. Flies can bite elephants, and men
with small arms can hurt those much more heavily armed. 6
However, it would seem likely that any government so evil as to
justify resistance and revolt would not hesitate to crush the
resistance of privately armed civilians. The Second Amendment
would not provide much of a shield in this situation.
It is democratic institutions, not guns, that protect us
against tyranny. Our bulwarks against oppression are free
speech and a free press and the right to elect our leaders and
look to an independent judiciary-not our right to keep arms to
revolt. Furthermore, it seems highly unlikely that in a country
where the fear of violent crime and terrorism spreads from New
York City to Oklahoma City to Atlanta, the Supreme Court
would limit gun control regulations necessary to protect us
against enemies, foreign or domestic, based on a theoretical right
to revolt protected by the Second Amendment.
Another argument supporting the republican militia theory
is that the states have the collective right to resist incursions by
the federal government. Tragically, the fears of conflict between
the states and the federal government did not prove as Madison
had envisioned." The question of whether the states, through
their armed citizens and their militia, could resist perceived
federal oppression was finally resolved in the bloody Civil
War.58 Again, it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court now
would protect the right of state militias to resist the federal gov-
ernment and engage in another civil war.
56. See Levinson, supra note 11, at 657 (stating that armed insurgency need
not be victorious to be an effective deterrent against tyranny); Nelson Lund, The
Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L.
REv. 103, 115 (1987) (adopting a cost/benefit analysis in correlating effectiveness of
rebellion not only to the capacity of obtaining victory, but also to the ability to raise
the cost of fighting).
57. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison). Madison had noted in his
quest for the Constitution's ratification that the concern of state conflict with a feder-
al army was exaggerated and improbable. See id. He further attempted to assuage
fears of federal power by claiming that the federal army would be powerless against
a community of well-armed state militias. See id. The Civil War and the ultimate
Union victory proved Madison's assertions tragically incorrect.
58. Orville J. Victor documented in his HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONSPIRACIES the
rebellious nature of the states and its citizens, which, in his opinion, foretold the
American Civil War. In his book published during the War, Orville wrote that "the
story of such conspiracies, insurrections and popular commotions ... directly ...
affected the order of society, the destiny of the States, [and] the political institutions
of the Republic." VICTOR, supra note 52, at 19.
[Vol. 58
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B. The Individual Right to Keep Arms Theory
A different interpretation of the Second Amendment is that
it ensures the right to bear arms quite apart from any militia
service. This argument is advanced on both textual and histori-
cal bases.
1. Textual Arguments
It can be argued that the text of the United States Constitu-
tion shows that the Second Amendment was designed not only to
protect the militia, 9 but also to protect the individual's right to
keep and bear arms.6" This argument is based upon the Second
Amendment's position within the Bill of Rights, which gives rise
to the assumption that the Second Amendment was designed to
protect individual rights, not simply to regulate the relation of
state militia and the federal government.61 According to this
argument, the text of the Second Amendment must be read as
are other provisions of the Bill of Rights, that is, in a way that
protects individual rights, not just the corporate rights of those
in a militia. 2 One could argue that the phrase "right of the peo-
ple" in the Second Amendment no more denotes a corporate right
than it does in the Fourth Amendment.63 The Fourth Amend-
ment does not merely protect the right of the people as a whole
against unreasonable searches or seizures but protects the rights
of individuals.6 Similarly, it can be argued that the right of the
59. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 10.
60. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 466-71; Kates, Original Meaning, supra
note 11, at 214-20.
61. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 466-67. The "standard model" scholars of
the Second Amendment interpret the Amendment as clearly granting an individual
right to arms by its very language. See id. As Professor Reynolds writes:
The text's support is seen as straightforward: the language used, after all,
is "right of the people," a term that appears in other parts of the Bill of
Rights that are universally interpreted as protecting individual rights. Thus
any argument that the right protected is not one enforceable by individuals
is undermined by the text.
Id.; see also Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11, at 218 (stating that logic and
constitutional consistency mandate that the right granted by the Second Amendment
be recognized as an individual "right of the people").
62. See id. at 214-20.
63. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated militia, being necessary
to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall
not be infringed.") with U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated . . ").
64. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (recognizing that the
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people to keep and bear arms in the Second Amendment must be
read to protect an individual right. The principal arguments
made by proponents of an individual right to bear arms theory,
however, are not textual but historical and philosophical.
2. Historical Arguments
Arms were pervasive in the America of the eighteenth centu-
ry. Not only were they necessary for militia service, but often for
life itself. Life was dangerous. A gun was essential to the protec-
tion of home and family from Indians, marauders and wild
beasts in the sparsely settled country. Self-defense was often the
only defense because no public authority could be called on to
guarantee safety. A disarmed America was not only unthinkable
politically, but was also a practical absurdity. Americans were
not merely armed by necessity, but undoubtedly thought they
had a right to be armed because of this necessity.
It may be argued that those who proposed and adopted the
Second Amendment shared a common historical and philosophi-
cal understanding that individuals had a right to keep arms for
self-defense. American Whigs, schooled in Locke, were exponents
of the natural right theory and incorporated that theory into the
Bill of Rights. 5 What could be more important than the right to
life and the means of defending it? Moreover, the Framers of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights were well read in Blackstone,
who set forth the right to keep arms for self-defense as a com-
mon-law right of free Englishmen.6 Furthermore, the Framers
were undoubtedly aware of, and sympathetic to, the principles
incorporated in the English Bill of Rights, the language of which
was a model for the Second Amendment. 7 This philosophical
Fourth Amendment protects individuals, not places, from unreasonable searches and
seizures and establishing the principle of a personal expectation of privacy).
65. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 129.
66. William Blackstone considered the right to personal security as one of the
traditional rights enjoyed by Englishmen and akin in importance to the rights to
liberty and property. See BLACKSTONE, supra note at 65, at 143-44. He considered
the right to bear arms an auxiliary right necessary to protect and maintain these
rights. See id. Blackstone further acknowledged the common-law right of self-defense
as a primary law of nature, and therefore, the "right of having and using arms for
self-preservation and defense" as inalienable. Id. at 130-34, 144. See also MALCOLM,
supra note 11, at 135-64; Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11, at 235-39 (dis-
cussing the English Bill of Rights and the common-law guarantee of private arms);
STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 1-17 (1989) (describing the outrage
at British attempts to disarm Boston colonists as a violation of their rights as Eng-
lishmen).
67. "Recent scholarship says that the English Bill of Rights was understood to
[Vol. 58
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background supports an interpretation of the Second Amend-
ment that establishes an individual right to keep arms specifical-
ly for self-defense. Some state constitutions expressly recognize
such a right.68 Although the federal Constitution does not con-
tain such an express recognition, this omission may not be due to
an outright rejection of the idea, but instead to an implicit un-
derstanding that it was included.69 Although disputed by some
historians,0 the proponents of this position have been prolific
and offer this historical view as a "standard model." 1
The Supreme Court has never accepted an individual right
theory of the Second Amendment. However, if the Court were to
accept such a theory, it would be deluged with a myriad of issues
not raised under the state militia theory. Three issues in particu-
lar would need to be addressed: (1) the right to keep arms for
self-defense by threatened groups; (2) the right to keep arms by
individuals generally; and (3) the right to keep arms for hunting
or other recreatioAal uses.
a. The Right to Keep Arms For Self-Defense by Threatened
Groups
It could be argued that the right of self-defense should not
be limited to individuals but should extend to threatened groups.
Throughout our history, certain groups of people have felt both
threatened by other groups and unable to rely on public authori-
ties to protect them. For example, white settlers were afraid of
Indian raids, and white slave owners were afraid of slave revolts.
Although the law clearly provided protection to the settlers and
the slave owners in these situations, law enforcement was not
always available. As a result, both settlers and slave holders
have recognized the right to keep arms for self defense." See Hardy, Historiography,
supra note 11, at 16-24; Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11, at 235-39.
68. See ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 26; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 26; COLO. CONST. art.
2, § 13; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 15; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 8;
IND. CONST. art. 1, § 32; KY. CONST. § 1, para. 7; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; NEB.
CONST. art I, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2-a; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OKLA. CONST.
art. II, § 26; OR. CONST. art. I, § 27; PA_ CONST. art. I, § 21; S.D. CONST. art. VI, §
24; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 23; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24; W. VA_ CONST. art. III, § 22; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 24.
69. See Hardy, Historiography, supra note 11, at 43-59.
70. See Herz, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. It is not within the scope of this
Article to review, yet again, all the arguments in favor or against this position, but
rather to indicate that there is an arguable historical basis for this interpretation of
the Second Amendment.
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were heavily armed, and no one attempted to disarm them. On
the other hand, the Indians and slaves did not have the law on
their side and were often desperately fearful of attacks by armed
whites. Did the law and the Constitution protect their rights to
defend themselves by being armed? Certainly not. Indians were
considered enemies-not citizens-and therefore, they were not
entitled to protection under the Constitution7" according to the
infamous Dred Scott decision, in which Chief Justice Taney ex-
pressed his horror at the thought of ruling that slaves were citi-
zens, for then, presumably, slaves would have the right to be
armed under the Second Amendment.73 Some African-American
commentators ironically say that, although Taney was wrong in
his central holding, he was right in asserting that the Second
Amendment protected the right to be armed.74 They argue that
armed blacks have discouraged and defended themselves against
attacks by groups like the Ku Klux Klan.75 They further argue
that the Second Amendment should therefore be considered a
bulwark in protecting African-American citizens in their legiti-
mate right to self-defense because it would keep them from being
disarmed as they were before the Civil War.7" Some even argue
72. The Framers left the legal status of Native Americans indefinite, although
it was implied that they were not considered citizens entitled to the rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution. This position was later endorsed in the decision Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, which set forth the relationship of American Indians with the
United States. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
In Cherokee Nation, the Cherokee tribe, as an independent nation, sought an
injunction against the state of Georgia from enforcing state laws and seizing Chero-
kee lands. See id. at 15. In denying the injunction, Chief Justice Marshall refused to
recognize the Cherokee as a foreign nation and definitively established all Indian
tribes as sovereigns to the federal government, possessing neither collective nor indi-
vidual rights under the Constitution. See id. at 17. Marshall stated that the Indian
tribes were in "a state of pupilage" and that their relation with the United States
resembled that of a ward to his guardian. See id. Therefore, Marshall went on to
hold that Indians were entitled only to those rights that Congress chose to bestow
upon them, not those granted citizens under the Constitutions. See id. at 18.
73. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
74. See generally Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-Americanist, supra note 11. These
scholars argue that the Dred Scott decision implicitly recognized the individual
citizen's right to arms. Therefore, all Americans, including African-Americans, have
the natural right to arm themselves. See id.
75. See Cottrol & Diamond, Racial Disparity, supra note 11, at 351-54.
76. See Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-Americanist, supra note 11, at 349-55 (noting
the importance that the right to arms had in African-American self-defense).
The disarming of African-Americans following the Civil War was a widespread
practice in the South. See id. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), paved the
way for segregation and separate treatment of black Americans. See Cottrol & Dia-
mond, Afro-Americanist, supra note 11, at 350. While Plessy has since been over-
turned, some modern Second Amendment scholars fear that current gun control legis-
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that the true purpose of gun control legislation since the Civil
War has been to disarm blacks again.7" The acceptance of this
argument, however, could be very dangerous to African-Amer-
icans and other minorities. The danger comes from the possibili-
ty that white racist citizens, like members of the Ku Klux Klan,
could also rely on this interpretation of the Second Amendment
to resist being disarmed. Moreover, the main danger in many
minority communities is the presence, not the absence, of guns
and other arms.78 In light of the present situation, in which Af-
rican-Americans and other minority groups are frequently the
victims of gun violence, I think it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court would adopt an historical argument that the Second
Amendment insures the right of one group of citizens to be
armed in order to contend with another group of armed citi-
zens.
79
b. The Right to Keep Arms For Self-Defense by Individuals
The historical argument for keeping arms for individual self-
defense may be more persuasive. In modern criminal law, there
are assumptions that the responsibility for keeping peace has
passed from the individual to the state and that the use of force
to keep the peace is effectively a state monopoly. This modern
view differs markedly from eighteenth century views.
In the eighteenth century, individuals and families often
lived far from any effective governmental help.8' Self-defense
was essentially the only defense and that defense usually re-
quired guns or some other weapons. Even in towns there was no
regular police, and residents had to rely on themselves and their
lation may have disparate racial implications and risks escalating oppressive conduct
toward disarmed African-Americans. See id. at 360-61; Cottroll & Diamond, Racial
Disparity, supra note 11, at 1333-34.
If, as these scholars allege, gun control laws are discriminatory as applied
against African-Americans, an alternate argument might be made. Gun control legis-
lation applicable to some groups and not others would present serious equal protec-
tion issues under the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, challenges to gun control
legislation might prove more effective under the Equal Protection Clause than the
Second Amendment for those arguing that such laws are racially motivated.
77. See Cottroll & Diamond, Afro-Americanist, supra note 11, at 360-61; Cottroll
& Diamond, Racial Disparity, supra note 11, at 1333-34; Reynolds, supra note 11, at
494 (noting that the "state rights" theory of the Second Amendment arose in the
twentieth century as an attempt to uphold laws primarily intended to disarm Afri-
can-Americans and immigrants).
78. See generally, Bogus, supra note 10; Herz, supra note 10.
79. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 464-71.
80. See generally Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11, at 214-16.
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arms for protection. Indeed, when public force was used for pro-
tection, private arms often played a role. Private individuals,
privately armed, were frequently pressed into service.81 It would
be hard to argue that at the time of the adoption of the Second
Amendment, the right of the individual to armed self-defense
had been ceded to the state. Even today there are vast open
areas which are lightly policed and dangerous urban areas where
it would seem foolhardy to await the assistance of the police
when under attack. As in the eighteenth century, self-defense
today is often a necessity.82 However, the issue is not whether a
right of self-defense was recognized at the time of the adoption of
the Bill of Rights, but rather, whether the Second Amendment
was intended to protect the right to keep arms for this purpose.
Neither the federal government nor the states have ever
purported to eliminate the right of self-defense through gun
control laws. They have, however, restricted access to arms and
regulated the varieties of arms which can be kept for self-de-
fense. If the Supreme Court construed the Second Amendment to
protect the right to keep arms for self-defense, it would be com-
pelled to review all gun control legislation in the light of this
Amendment. Initially, the Court would have to determine what
kind of arms would be protected under this theory.
If the right of self-defense is an accepted justification for the
right to keep arms under the Second Amendment, the type of
arms kept would still have to have a reasonable relation to self-
defense. The right to keep arms for self-defense would certainly
81. See id.
82. See Moncure, supra note 11, at 590. William Blackstone noted that the
common law recognized the three fundamental rights of the people as "the right to
personal security, the right of personal liberty and the right of private property." 4
BLACKSTONE, supra note 65, at 3. In fact, Blackstone identified self-defense as the
"primary law of nature so it is not, neither can it be, in fact, taken away by the law
of society." Id. at 144.
James Kent, a nineteenth century legal commentator, also likened the right of
self-defense as a natural law that "cannot be superseded by the law of society." 2
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw, 16. He noted that "municipal
law . . . has . . . left with individuals the exercise of the natural right of self-de-
fence, in all those cases in which the law is either too slow or too feeble to stay the
hand of violence." Id.
These commentaries concerning the fundamental nature of the right to individ-
ual self-defense suggest that modern challenges to gun control legislation might fair
well if framed as intrusions upon the substantive due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand
its list of "fundamental rights," the historical antecedents to the right of armed self-
defense are stronger and more clear than those for the recognized rights of abortion
or birth control and, therefore, could also conceivably be recognized by the Court.
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not include the right to keep an arsenal. Even under a self-de-
fense reading of the Second Amendment, the state could limit
the kind and number of weapons that could be kept to those
appropriate for self-defense. To do this, the Court would need to
review legislation to determine if it impinged on the legitimate
keeping of arms for self-defense, either on its face or as applied.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Millers3 suggested
that if the possession of arms was protected under the Second
Amendment, it was limited to arms similar to those used in the
militia.8" Because the Supreme Court made this limitation, per-
haps it should have also limited possession to those weapons
that were used in the eighteenth century: the swords, rifles, and
muskets of the colonial militiaman. Or perhaps the Court should
have held that the possession of all weapons that could be used
by state militias in modern warfare is protected under the Sec-
ond Amendment. In such a case, because almost every kind of
weapon may be used in today's warfare, the only arms left un-
protected would be those unusable antique weapons that could
not be related to military practice."5 Under this interpretation,
arms protected under the Second Amendment could include not
only the armed tanks favored by Mr. DuPont,"6 but also high
83. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
84. See id. at 178. See also Levinson, supra note 11, at 654-55 (recognizing that
Miller can be read to support extreme anti-gun control arguments, including the
right of individual possession of "bazookas, rocket launchers, and other armaments");
Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11, at 248-50, 260-61 (interpreting Miller as re-
quiring arms to be commonly used and part of ordinary military equipment to quali-
fy for Second Amendment protection). But see, Herz, supra note 10, at 68 (question-
ing a broad reading of Miller, which conceivably allows private possession of military
armament).
85. See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (lst Cir. 1942). The court in Cas-
es was forced to interpret the extent of Miller just three years after the Supreme
Court decided that case. In affirming a conviction for the illegal transport and re-
ceipt of firearms and ammunition, the First Circuit construed the reach of Miller,
stating that "if the rule of the Miller case is general and complete, the result would
follow that, under present day conditions, the federal government would be empow-
ered only to regulate the possession or use of weapons such as flintlock musket or
matchlock harquebus." Id. at 922. The court held that such a reading of Miller, limit-
ing federal regulatory power to antique weaponry and protecting any arms tenuously
related to the militia, "is in effect to hold that the limitation of the Second Amend-
ment is absolute." Id. In refusing to give Miller this effect, the First Circuit dis-
missed the notion that any weapon that conceivably could qualify as a militia-type
weapon is beyond the scope of federal control. See id.
86. John DuPont, an eccentric millionaire from suburban Philadelphia, was
known for his extensive weapons collection and for driving about in an armored
military vehicle. In January of 1996, Mr. DuPont stayed off police for two days with
the threat of his armament while he was being sought for shooting a guest to death
on his estate. See N.B.C. Nightly News: Eccentric Millionaire John DuPont Arrested
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explosives or even atomic weapons."
This would, of course, be absurd. What is not absurd, howev-
er, is to consider how difficult it is to be true to the eighteenth
century in the twentieth century. Under a self-defense theory,
there would be formidable problems of deciding which weapons
are or are not suitable for self-defense in view of modern con-
cerns. The current perception about which weapons are suitable
for self-defense has clearly evolved since the eighteenth century.
For example, the possession of weapons is more widespread
today, and the weapons themselves are now more varied and
lethal.8" If an intruder could have a machine gun, is a machine
gun necessary to defend against potential intruders? If the Su-
preme Court were to adopt a self-defense theory it would be
forced to resolve countless issues such as this. In case after case,
the Court would then have to consider which weapons would
warrant Second Amendment protection.89
An added concern regarding the self-defense theory is the
suggestion that a right to self-defense exists to protect not just a
home but a neighborhood; in other words, the self-defense theory
may extend to a collective self-defense. This notion of a collective
self-defense raises the issue of whether a group has the right to
have an armed private "police." America has a long tradition of
private police including Pinkertons, company police, security
guards, and even the "Town Watch" movement.9" These private
police are both lauded and feared and are usually carefully regu-
for Murder of Olympic Wrestler, (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 29, 1996).
87. See Levinson, supra note 11, at 654-55.
88. See Dunlap, supra note 10, at 666-68.
89. See Levinson, supra note 11, at 653-56; Kates, Original Meaning, supra note
11, at 248-61; Herz, supra note 10, at 68.
The political furor surrounding the "Assault Weapons Ban" illustrates the pas-
sionate arguments a court might face if an individual right to armed self-defense was
recognized. Enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, the statute prohibits nineteen types of semi-automatic weapons. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 13701-14223 (1994). Hotly debated in Congress, the assault gun ban still
stirs controversy in both academia and popular America. See Harry A. Chernoff, et.
al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527 (1996); Herb Kohl, Response to
The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 581 (1996); See also Kopel, supra note
11.
90. Town Watch groups became popular in the 1980's as a local method of
combating crime. These private groups, which often act in tandem with law enforce-
ment, have grown significantly in their number and effectiveness. See Walt Philbin,
Local Parties Leading Again: "Night Out" Tops in United States, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 9, 1996, at B1 (documenting the Town Watch movement and
noting that the 13th annual Town Watch 'night out" involved over 29.5 million
Americans in 9,000 communities).
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lated. Under the self-defense theory of the Second Amendment,
the Court would have to consider whether the keeping of arms
by these private police would be entitled to heightened constitu-
tional protection. Specifically, the Supreme Court would be asked
whether these groups could assert the right to keep arms appro-
priate to a police force yet not allowed to individuals.
This, and a myriad of other related questions, would face the
Court if it adopted a self-defense theory of the Second Amend-
ment. As a further example, if one has the right to possess arms
for self-defense under the Second Amendment, a related question
would arise of whether one has the right of access to these arms.
If there is such a right, the Court would be asked to review a
wide range of laws, both federal and state, that limit access to
and possession of arms in the following manner: first, by control-
ling the manufacture, importation, and sale of arms; second, by
requiring licensing and registration of guns;9 and third, by reg-
ulating the concealment of guns.2 Federal laws that create such
limits on the use and possession of arms used in self-defense
would be open to constitutional scrutiny under the Second
Amendment.
In conclusion, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would
extend the state militia theory to an absolute right of self-de-
fense.93 I doubt that the Court would cut anchor from this inter-
pretation of the Second Amendment unless the Court was per-
suaded that history and logic compelled the adoption of an midi-
vidual right to keep and bear arms. Policy could also convince
the Court that to refuse to adopt this reading would expose peo-
91. See, e.g., the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)
(1994) ("Brady Act"). The Brady Act amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 and re-
quires mandatory waiting periods and background checks prior to the purchase of a
handgun. The constitutionality of the Act was immediately challenged in the Senate
where it was hotly debated and became the subject of filibusters, amendments, and
presidential veto threats. H.R. REP. No. 103-344, at 12-13 (1993). For further discus-
sion of the debate surrounding the Brady Act and other restrictive legislation, see
Bob Dole, The Brady Bill: It's Just Not Enough, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 135
(1993-94); Dyan Finguerra, The Tenth Amendment Shoots Down The Brady Act, 3
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 637 (1995); Ronald A. Giller, Federal Gun Control in the
United States: Revival of the Tenth Amendment, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMEN-
TARY 151 (1994).
92. See also Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, 'Shall Issue:" The New Wave
of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679 (1995) (exploring legisla-
tion affecting the right to carry concealed handguns).
93. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing that the due pro-
cess right of privacy limits a legislature's freedom to proscribe or regulate abortion);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (the first major modern case to protect
a fundamental right using substantive due process reasoning).
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ple to the deprivation of meaningful rights which could only be
secured by judicial protection. I do not think the Court would be
persuaded by the argument that such a reading is at least as
plausible as a state militia reading. The language of the Second
Amendment connects the right to keep arms to the militia, and
historically, the fear of a standing army can explain this connec-
tion.
c. The Right to Keep Arms for Hunting or Other Recreational
Uses
Some of the most fervent arguments for Second Amendment
protection for the keeping of guns come from those who keep
guns for hunting or other recreational purposes. In the eigh-
teenth century people kept guns for hunting, sport, and duel-
ing.94 Undoubtedly, people also kept gun collections." Howev-
er, it is not likely that possession of weapons for these uses was
protected as a right under the Second Amendment. For, while
there is legitimate argument that self-defense is an inalienable
right, and the right to keep arms was given to support this right,
there is no similar argument for hunting, shooting, gun collect-
ing or other recreational uses of guns. Although in the eigh-
teenth century hunting may have been relatively free from re-
straint, in the last two centuries the states have increasingly
regulated this activity in the interest of game management and
public safety. It is unlikely that arms used for hunting would be
protected any more than the right to hunt itself.96
It is true that, at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted,
94. See Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11, at 228-29; Moncure, supra note
11 (recognizing traditional reasons for gun possession in the United States as defense
of self and state, hunting, and recreation).
95. Thomas Jefferson, for one, maintained a substantial collection of weapons at
Monticello and was a supporter of the individual right to arms. He wrote:
As to the species of exercise, I advise the gun. While this gives a moderate
exercise to the body, it gives boldness, enterprise and independence to the
mind. Games played with ball, and others of that nature, are too violent for
the body, and stamp no character on the mind. Let your gun therefore be
the constant companion of your walks.
1 THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA 318 (John P. Foley ed., reissued 1967).
96. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371 (1978). In
Baldwin, the Supreme Court upheld a Montana statute which required out-of-state
hunters to pay a higher license fee to hunt than Montana residents. See id. at 372-
73. In holding that the licensing system did not violate the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of Article IV, the Court noted that recreational hunting is not a funda-
mental right and therefore is readily subject to state and local regulation. See id. at
388.
[Vol. 58
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Americans highly valued their right to hunt. Some Pennsylvani-
ans, who were as passionate of hunters then as now, wanted the
right to keep arms for hunting to be included in the Bill of
Rights.97 However, no such express right was included, and
there is little reason to believe that the failure to mention hunt-
ing within the language of the Second Amendment was an over-
sight or a belief that it was already covered elsewhere. It would
be difficult to show that the right to keep arms for hunting was
either a common-law or natural right of the same order of impor-
tance as the right to keep arms for self-defense."
Although one judge has indicated that gun collectors ought
to be considered differently than collectors of other items99 be-
cause of the Second Amendment, I do not think the Supreme
Court would adopt this position either. To do so would require a
reading of the Second Amendment as a protection of the keeping
of arms no matter how trivial the reason.
III. STATE AND FEDERAL POWER UNDER THE SECOND
AMENDMENT
If the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment is
only designed to protect state militia from federal interference,
the Amendment would not be a limit on the state's power to
enact gun control laws but would only be a limit on the federal
government's power to do so. However, if the Supreme Court
held that the Second Amendment creates a personal right to
keep arms, the Supreme Court would be required to decide
whether or not the Second Amendment was incorporated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is difficult
to imagine that the Supreme Court today would hold there is an
97. See Hardy, Historiography, supra note 11, at 45-46. The minority delegates
at the Pennsylvania State Convention of 1790 unsuccessfully proposed express protec-
tion for the right to bear arms for hunting. The proposal stated "[tihat the people
have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own State . . . or
for the purpose of killing game . . . ." Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
98. Regardless, respect for hunters' interest groups is a powerful influencing
factor on gun control legislation. For example, President Clinton has repeatedly em-
phasized that the gun control laws he favors, such as the Brady Act and Assault
Weapons Ban, do not restrict the ability to hunt. President Clinton has contended
that "two hunting seasons have come and gone since the two bills have been enacted
and no sportsman has lost a gun or the right to hunt." Thomas B. Edskall, Wedge
Attack May Not Find an Opening: Administration Has a Defense in Place, WASH.
POST, Oct. 18, 1996, at A32.
99. See United States v. Breier, 827 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting) (likening a defendant gun collector to "a hobbyist who has been turned
into a criminal by the too vivid zeal of government agents and prosecutors").
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individual right to keep arms protected against federal laws but
not against state laws. Such a holding would suggest that the
Amendment gives protection against Washington D.C., but not
against Boston. Notwithstanding this, some cases indicate the
Court might not find that the Second Amendment was incorpo-
rated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1" I think it is clear that if the Supreme Court held that
individual rights were protected under the Second Amendment,
it would find that the Amendment is applicable to the states.
A fascinating issue that could arise if the Supreme Court
held there was an individual right to keep arms is whether the
Second Amendment is both a limit on federal power and a poten-
tial source of federal power. In other words, could Congress de-
clare, contrary to Miller, that the Second Amendment does pro-
tect the individual right to keep arms and pass legislation limit-
100. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (noting that the right of citizens
to arm themselves affects only the federal government and not the states); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (recognizing that the individual right to
bear arms existed prior to the Constitution, but holding that the Second Amendment
restricts only federal intrusion on that right).
Those African-American scholars who argued that the Second Amendment
should have aided blacks in their right to defend themselves after the Civil War
would be shocked by such a holding. Their whole argument is premised on the unas-
sailable assumption that the ante-bellum laws, which disarmed blacks, would be
struck down after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Cottrol & Dia-
mond, Afro-Americanist, supra note 11, at 345-49. Arguably, the ante-bellum laws
which disarmed the freed slaves were a significant influence on the Thirty-ninth
Congress' debate concerning the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 346. They also
played a part in the nation's broader reconsideration of the balance between princi-
ples of federalism and individual rights. See id. However, whether or not Congress
intended the Fourteenth Amendment to protect citizens from state deprivations of the
Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court, beginning with the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), sought to preserve the nation's pre-war federalist structure
and judicially limited the Fourteenth Amendment's scope. See Cottrol & Diamond,
Afro-Americanist, supra note 11, at 346-47. As a result, the Second Amendment was
effectively limited to application against the federal government, and the post-war
disarming of African-Americans was allowed to continue. See generally Cruikshank,
92 U.S. at 542. Without the protective arm of the federal government to ensure their
right of armed self-defense, the personal security and political rights of southern
blacks were left largely to hostile state governments. See Cottrol & Diamond, Afro-
Americanist, supra note 11, at 348. In the Jim Crow era that followed, the necessity
of bearing arms would become a critically important issue to African-Americans. See
id.
The United States' history of marginalization and discrimination against wom-
en also raises interesting issues concerning the effect a limited Second Amendment
right has on female citizens. See Inge Anna Larish, Note, Why Annie Can't Get Her
Gun: A Feminist Perspective on the Second Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 467
(1996) (noting that women are denied the right of self-defense and protection under a
reading of the Second Amendment that does not grant an individual the right to
bear arms).
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ing state gun control laws under its power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment?' If so, would the Supreme Court be
bound by this congressional declaration? I think the Court would
not consider itself bound, but would distinguish the attempt of
Congress to expand the scope of a right and its attempt to create
a right.' 2 However, if the Supreme Court were to adopt an in-
dividual rights theory, Congress would have power to limit state
gun control legislation under section five of the Fourteenth
101. Arguably, Congress has already made such a statement. See Stephen P.
Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations by a Co-Equal
Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REv. 597
(1995). Following the Civil War, Congress passed the Freedmen's Bureau Act of 1866
in response to the Southern State's slave codes, which forbade basic civil rights, in-
cluding the right to bear arms, from African-Americans. See id. at 598. The act spe-
cifically provided that the new American citizens should have "full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty . . . including the constitu-
tional right to bear arms . . . ." Id. The same Congress adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment two years later. See HALBROOK, supra at 598. In 1941, Congress spoke
again concerning the inherent nature of the right to keep weapons. When it passed
the Property Requisition Act during the Second World War, Congress specifically
exempted personal firearms from the scope of the act, noting that "nothing in this
Act shall be construed . . . to impair or infringe in any manner the right of any
individual to keep and bear arms." Property Requisition Act of 1941, Pub. L. No.
274, 55 Stat. 742; see HALBROOK, supra at 599. Finally, in 1986, Congress reaffirmed
the right to keep and bear arms for the third, and most recent time. In the Fire-
arms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Congress noted that the "rights of citizens . . .
to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion ... require[d] additional legislation to correct existing firearms statutes and
enforcement policies ... ." Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1994).
102. The "ratchet theory," a theory propounded by Justice Brennan, suggests that
Congress has the power to expand the prism of substantive rights guaranteed under
the Fourteenth Amendment, but lacks the power to dilute them. See Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Further, while Congress has the power to broaden a
right, it is precluded from creating a new right under the auspices of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Therefore, the deference afforded to Congress by the Court might validate legislation
that expands the scope of the Second Amendment guarantee to arms and effectively
limits Cruikshank's rule of the non-applicability of the Second Amendment to the
states. However, such legislation could neither dilute the right to bear arms nor
could it be viewed as creating a new substantive right to take its place. See Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S. 226 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Quite opposite from the issue of Congress expanding the right to bear arms,
substantial questions arise concerning Congress's ability to otherwise federally restrict
that right. Since the 1930s, Congress has found little difficulty in sustaining federal
health and safety legislation under one of its enumerated powers, such as the taxing
and spending power or its control over interstate commerce. Recently, however, in
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), what seemed a settled principle
became unsettled. In a five-to-four decision, the Court struck down a federal statute
prohibiting the possession of firearms in a school zone as not sufficiently connected
to commerce. The ramifications of Lopez have not been worked out, but it is possible
that the limits on federal power in Article I and an appeal to state rights under the
Tenth Amendment might prove an effective barrier to federal gun control legislation.
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Amendment. 03
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT
As discussed above, under a state militia theory of the Sec-
ond Amendment, few, if any, cases would arise involving federal
gun control statutes impinging on state militia because no gun
control legislation has been directed at the keeping of arms for
state militia purposes. Thus, there is little need to discuss what
level of scrutiny would be appropriate in cases where gun control
legislation is challenged under the Second Amendment. How-
ever, under a theory that the Second Amendment is applicable to
individual possession of arms, there would be many cases to
review because almost all gun control laws could be challenged
for impinging on someone's right to keep arms. Some cases
would involve threshold questions, like those previously dis-
cussed, concerning what kind of arms are covered by the Second
Amendment."°4 More questions would arise in cases such as
those involving hand gun regulations, where the weapons regu-
lated are appropriate for self-defense.0 5 In these self-defense
cases, the Court would first make a finding that the regulation
did impinge on the individual right to keep arms for self-defense
and then decide whether the regulation was invalid under the
Second Amendment. When there is a clear conflict between a
gun control statute and the asserted right to keep arms, it is
unlikely that the Supreme Court would hold this right absolute
and require a constitutional amendment to sustain any state or
federal legislation that impinges on the keeping of arms."0 6
Rather, the Court will likely consider the conflict between the
Second Amendment right to keep arms and the government's
right under its police power to control arms to protect the public
against danger of death and injury caused by weapons. The
Court would then be faced with the problem of deciding what
approaches and tests should be used for judicial review in these
cases.
One suggested approach is to treat the Second Amendment
like the First Amendment. The most famous slogan of those who
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
104. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
105. See Kates, Original Meaning, supra note 11.
106. This analysis will occur no matter how strongly the state or the federal
government connects the legislation to its interest in public peace and safety. See
Van Alstyne, supra note 11, at 1253 (noting that although the right to bear arms
may be personal, the right is not necessarily absolute).
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oppose gun controls is "Guns Don't Kill, People Do." Implicit in
this slogan is the argument that harm comes not from the mere
possession of arms, but from their improper use. Because gun
control regulations that focus on obtaining and possessing guns
necessarily apply before any harm has been done, it could be
argued that the Court should adopt a First Amendment ap-
proach in Second Amendment cases and apply a "prior restraint"
standard similar to that applied in First Amendment cases in-
volving freedom of speech or of the press.0 7 Under the "prior
restraint test," almost all gun control regulations would be pre-
sumptively unconstitutional, and a very heavy burden would be
placed on the state to overcome this presumption. Arguably, a
free speech standard is appropriate because both the right to free
speech and the right to keep arms are essential to a democracy.
It could be argued that just as free speech is essential to the
functioning of our democracy, so too is the right to keep and bear
arms essential to our survival as a free people.
The likely success of this "free speech" argument is doubtful.
First, the values that would be protected under the Second
Amendment have little to do with those that gave rise to the
prior restraint standard under the First Amendment; the fear of
"chilling effects" of prior restraints on the exercising of First
Amendment rights is hardly applicable to the Second Amend-
ment. Opinions are formed and laws are made by the effect of
words, not guns. Second, the possibility of harm coming from the
possession of a press is quite different from the possibility of
harm from possession of a gun. The First Amendment may, in
most cases, require us to wait until we hear the words, but does
the Second Amendment require us to wait until we hear the
gunfire? The state surely has an interest in preventing carnage,
not just in picking up the dead and wounded and punishing
those responsible. A legislature cannot be presumed to have
acted unconstitutionally when it passes gun control measures for
the purpose of preventing the harm that can be caused by guns.
For the same reasons that the Supreme Court would reject a
"prior restraint" test, it is also highly unlikely that the Court
would adopt other standard First Amendment tests such as a
"clear and present danger" test,' a Brandenburg "proximity"
107. The Doctrine of Prior Restraints was a reaction against the old English li-
censing scheme by which nothing could be published without prior state approval. In
reaction, First Amendment establishes that any governmental action that prevents
expression from occurring, as distinguished from punishment once it had occurred, is
presumptively unconstitutional. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 719 (1931).
108. The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine was developed by Justice Oliver
1091997]
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test," or an "overbreadth" test."'
The Court must be persuaded to adopt a "balancing test."
This test would require the Court to balance the interest the
state has in preventing harm against the interest of the individ-
ual to possess arms."' Because the safety of many (the public)
always outweighs the safety of one, application of this "balancing
test" would not be very effective in protecting the right to keep
arms. Any protection offered by a balancing test like this may
well prove illusory because the weights are loaded in favor of the
state. However, one benefit of such a test would be that the
Court would require the state to come forth with evidence of real
danger posed by gun ownership, rather than hypothetical as-
sumptions. Unfortunately, this evidentiary requirement may
again prove of little practical advantage to those who oppose gun
controls laws."' The legislature would have little trouble
finding some experts and some data to bolster its safety claims,
and legislative judgment that is supported by evidence, especial-
Wendell Holmes and holds that speech, which has "all the effect of force," is not pro-
tected by the First Amendment. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919). Under this Doctrine, legislation restricting First Amendment free speech will
be upheld if necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger. See id. at 52.
109. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, an anony-
mous per curiam decision by the Supreme Court, the Court purported to summarize
the previous fifty years of free speech analysis. See id. at 447-48. The Court stated
that legislation which proscribes speech is unconstitutional unless it is directed to
inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. See
id. at 448-49.
110. The Overbreadth Doctrine maintains that the government may not achieve
its concededly valid purpose by legislation that has an unnecessarily broad reach. See
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). The doctrine requires that a stat-
ute be invalidated if it punishes protected speech or conduct in its effort to regulate
otherwise unprotected expression. See id. at 613.
111. Justice Harlan interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment with such a balanc-
ing approach. He believed that in recognizing that a person has a liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause, a court still needed to balance the interest with the
countervailing interest asserted by the state. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
672 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In this respect, fundamental rights existed on a
continuum, where competing state and individual interests must be weighed. This
balancing approach to the rights falling within the Fourteenth Amendment has great-
ly influenced recent Supreme Court decisions. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (weighing state and liberty interests in a case involving
the right to refuse medical treatment); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (weighing state and liberty interests in a case involving a woman's right to
abortion); see also Brian C. Goebel, Note, Who Decides if There is "Triumph in the
Ultimate Agony?": Constitutional Theory and the Emerging Right to Die with Dignity,
37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827 (1996) (exploring Harlan's balancing approach to liberty
interests and applying those principles to "right to die" cases).
112. For an in-depth examination of a compelling argument for the modern push
for gun control legislation, see Herz, supra note 10.
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ly when it concerns public safety, is unlikely to be overturned
even if there are good arguments and evidence supporting a
different conclusion. Except for the rare case of gun control legis-
lation that has no connection to public safety, gun control legisla-
tion would survive scrutiny by the Court under a "balancing
test."
An alternate approach available to the Court is to treat the
Second Amendment right to bear arms as a fundamental right
and subject any gun control legislation or regulation that im-
pinges on this right to a strict scrutiny test.' It could be ar-
gued that this test should be applied to protect Second
Amendment rights because the Second Amendment rights are
specifically enunciated in the Constitution. This test would re-
quire that the legislation be narrowly tailored to accomplish a
compelling state interest. Although this strict scrutiny standard
would seem to give more protection to those challenging gun con-
trol legislation than would a "balancing test," it is doubtful that
the adoption of this test would significantly advance their cause.
Again, the reason gun control legislation would survive even this
test is the overwhelming public safety concern. In the context of
this strict scrutiny, the Court would most likely find that public
safety constitutes a compelling state interest, and legislation
would pass muster on this count. However, despite proof of a
compelling state interest for regulations, the legislation must
face one additional hurdle under this strict scrutiny test-it
must be narrowly tailored. In a few cases, proponents of gun
control legislation might convince the Court that the legislation
is not narrowly tailored. For instance, if the state asserted a
safety concern with assault weapons, legislation that also cov-
ered hand guns might be challenged. But few disputes will be of
this nature. Most legislation will assert broad safety concerns
and broad gun control measures to match, covering both "good"
and "bad" gun possessors and "good" and "bad" guns. Such legis-
lation cannot be narrowly tailored to reach only the bad people
who kill with their innocent guns. I think it is doubtful that the
Court would strike down gun control laws as poorly tailored and
give sewing lessons on the correct patterns of gun control legisla-
tion to Congress or state legislatures.
In conclusion, even if the opponents of gun control laws can
convince the Court that the Second Amendment does cover indi-
113. See BiACKSTONE, supra note 65; Moncure, supra note 11, at 590 (stating
that the right to have arms is auxiliary to the fundamental right to self-defense).
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vidual possession of arms, they may have won the battle but not
the war. Gun control laws may well pass muster under whatever
"test" the Court might apply in reviewing them.
V. CONCLUSION
I think the Supreme Court is not likely to rely on the Second
Amendment to invalidate either federal or state gun control laws
for several reasons. The primary reason for this conclusion is
that guns are dangerous, and the criminal or accidental use of
guns can kill or wound. Gun control laws are enacted to diminish
this danger. Of course, there are fiery disputes between "pro-
gun" groups and "anti-gun" groups about such questions as
whether the danger has been over-estimated, whether some guns
are more dangerous than others, and whether particular regula-
tions would be effective. Instead of attempting to resolve all of
these issues in the courts, I believe the Court would determine
that these issues are best left to Congress or state legislatures.
Therefore, I think that the Supreme Court would avoid these
problems by adhering to a reading of the Second Amendment
which would conclude that no personal right to keep arms is
secured by the Amendment, and, therefore, gun regulation affect-
ing the possession of guns does not present a Second Amend-
ment question.
However, it is possible that the Court might be persuaded by
the barrage of articles and books supporting an individual rights
theory.114 If the Court adopted this reading of the Second
Amendment, it would have to consider the Amendment when
reviewing gun control laws. I believe that in reviewing such
legislation, the Court would reject First Amendment tests and
apply a balancing test to weigh the Second Amendment interest
against the state's interest in public safety. The Court would
give great weight to the state's safety interest and, as stated
above, would be unlikely to substitute its judgment for the
state's determination. The scales would tip almost always in
favor of the state. Only in cases where there is obviously no
arguable safety interest would the scales come down in favor of
the Second Amendment claim, and it is difficult to imagine that
much, if any, gun control legislation would be of this character.
The Court might be persuaded to adopt a strict scrutiny
114. These theories suggest that any other decision would make the Second
Amendment almost meaningless and would be inconsistent with the idea of the right
to keep arms at the time of the adoption of the Amendment.
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standard, which could put the broadest gun control legislation
into question, but even then the state would be likely to prevail
except in the rare case where the legislation was very badly
tailored indeed. Thus, all, or almost all, cases would be resolved
in the same way, whether or not the Second Amendment is ap-
plied and whether or not the Court adopts a strict scrutiny stan-
dard. At least in the courts, the sound and the fury over the
correct reading of the Second Amendment would signify nothing.
On the other hand, in the popular press, the scholarly jour-
nals, and the legislative halls, arguments about the Second
Amendment continue to signify a great deal. Whether or not they
have forensic importance, Second Amendment studies illuminate
important pages in our early history. A commitment to indepen-
dence and self-sufficiency characteristic of many Second Amend-
ment enthusiasts can sometimes take an ugly and dangerous
form as in Waco or recently here in Montana,"' but it should
not be forgotten that these values have deep roots in American
history and in the American psyche. To ignore or depreciate
these values would be insensitive to our history and to the basic
beliefs of many honest present-day Americans. In considering
gun control proposals, legislators should give heed not only to
the voting power of gun control opponents (which they obviously
do), but also give weight to the fact that many Americans believe
that they have an historic right as free Americans to keep arms
to ensure their liberty and safety. In the war over gun controls,
the Second Amendment may be considered far more relevant in
arguments in the public forum than it would be in arguments
before the Supreme Court.
Gun control opponents may win in the legislature, although
they would lose in the courts. It is not a bad thing for the legisla-
tures to protect rights that have not been protected by the Su-
115. The potential threat of an armed citizenry recently manifested itself in the
1993 Waco, Texas disaster and the 1995 Freeman Compound standoff.
In Waco, an armed group of religious zealots held off government law enforce-
ment for several weeks following a dramatic shootout in which numerous federal
agents and cultists were killed and injured. The standoff ended when the religious
sect burned their compound, killing everyone inside. See Dick Johnson, 40 Bodies of
Cult Members are Found in Charred Ruins, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1993, at Al.
While not rising to an exchange of gun fire, the standoff at the Freeman com-
pound in Montana also exemplified the potential threat of a renegade armed group
to both the community and the nation. The Freemen, a group claiming independence
from national authority, threatened their neighbors and the federal government with
armed resistance in disputes over property annexation. See Kim Murphy, Renegades
Take Refuge in Plain Sight in Montana-Threat of Violence Prevents Capture,
PHOENIX GAZETrE, July 21, 1995, at A23.
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preme Court. For example, Congress gives newspaper reporters
testimonial privileges from searches and seizures, which had
been denied to them under the First Amendment.11 Additional-
ly, Congress protects the aged and handicapped, who were not
given special protection under the Equal Protection clause.117
However, it may be a bad thing for legislatures to rely on the
Second Amendment to justify their refusal to enact gun control
laws, ignoring the uniform federal case law and causing confu-
sion in the public about the meaning of the Second
Amendment."' Additionally, it would be disastrous for legisla-
tures to refuse to provide for public safety because of a mistaken
absolutist view of the Second Amendment.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (1994). This subchapter of the Privacy Protection
Act, titled "First Amendment Privacy Protection," prohibits the seizure of a
newspaper's or newsperson's work product or documentary materials by a government
agent unless the materials are specifically related to a criminal offense. See id.
117. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994).
118. See Herz, supra note 10.
[Vol. 58114
36
Montana Law Review, Vol. 58 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol58/iss1/5
